Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder by Johnson, Kevin R.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 92 
Issue 4 Symposium - Crimmigration: Crossing 




Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the Immigration 
Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder 
Kevin R. Johnson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the Immigration Removal Process: The Case 
of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 92 Denv. U. L. Rev. 701 (2015). 
This Addresses is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please 
contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
CRIMMIGRATION: KEYNOTE ADDRESS
RACIAL PROFILING IN THE WAR ON DRUGS MEETS THE




Today, I want to discuss the Supreme Court's decision in
Moncrieffe v. Holder.' In analyzing that case, I will try to show how the
criminal justice system of the United States, and its disparate treatment
of racial minorities, contributes to the current racially disparate impacts
in the immigration removal process.
The Supreme Court's decision in Moncrieffe started me thinking in
earnest about the relationship between the criminal justice system and
immigration removal. In that case, Adrian Moncrieffe, a lawful perma-
nent resident, was facing removal from the United States based on a
criminal conviction for possession of the equivalent of two to three mari-
juana cigarettes.2 Addressing a straightforward question of immigration
law, the Court found that the U.S. government could not remove
Moncrieffe from the country.3 The Court specifically held that, because
the crime in question did not constitute an "aggravated felony,"4 manda-
tory removal was not justified.
Given that it was reviewing an administrative removal order, the
Supreme Court understandably focused on Moncrieffe's removal pro-
ceeding. Moncrieffe's arrest and drug conviction was not challenged in
that proceeding. The Court did not have the full record of the arrest and
conviction before it. In thinking about the case, I had some intuitions
about what Moncrieffe might look like, what his experiences with the
police might be, and the kind of person the police in Georgia would tar-
get for scrutiny. From the information that I collected about the stop,
t Kevin R. Johnson is the Dean and Mabie-Apallas Professor of Public Interest Law and
Chicana/o Studies at the University of California Davis School of Law. This address was based on
Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the Immigration Removal Process:
The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 967 (2015). This is an edited transcript
of my keynote address at the Denver University Law Review Crimmigration conference in February
2015. Thanks to law student Sadie Weller for proofreading this transcript.
1. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
2. See id.at 1683.
3. See id. at 1683-84.
4. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43) (2015).
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arrest, and conviction in that case, we can learn about the influence of
race on the criminal justice system and how such impacts are magnified
when that system feeds into the immigration removal process.
At the time of the Court's decision, Moncrieffe was a twenty-five-
year-old lawful permanent resident from Jamaica. The Court's opinion
does not mention that he is Black, but I guessed (correctly, as it turned
out) that he was. Through a public information act request, I obtained the
police report on Moncrieffe's arrest.5 To answer some questions about
the report, my research assistant contacted the arresting officer, whose
profile was available on the social media website LinkedIn. He respond-
ed with a memorandum6 explaining various aspects of the police report.
So I ultimately had a police report, with some detail, and a memo from
the arresting officer with even greater detail, as well as the Supreme
Court's decision in the case, all providing facts about the criminal case.
I. MONCRIEFFE V. HOLDER AND RACIAL PROFILING
In light of the fact that racial minorities are overrepresented in the
criminal justice system, President Obama's focus on the removal of im-
migrants who have committed crimes has not-so-subtle racial conse-
quences. Because of racial justice concerns, I looked carefully at
Moncrieffe and thought about the relationship between the criminal jus-
tice system and how it compounds racial disparities in removals. The
criminal justice system today disproportionately arrests and convicts
Latina/os and African Americans. Not surprisingly, because the removal
system relies heavily on a criminal justice system with racially disparate
impacts, one can logically expect removals with racially disparate im-
pacts. As it turns out, more than ninety-five percent of the noncitizens
removed from the country annually are Latina/o. Moncrieffe highlights
the racial justice implications of basing immigration removals on crimi-
nal convictions.
A. The Stop
According to the police report, City of Perry, Georgia, police officer
Ron Brainard on June 13, 2006, was monitoring traffic on Interstate 75, a
main artery from Georgia to Florida. A resident of Palm Beach,
Moncrieffe later told the officer that he had made the trip to visit his
daughter for a long weekend in Atlanta. Over the years, police reportedly
have targeted African Americans for traffic stops on the interstate.
5. See Johnson, supra note , at 985 n.97 (citing PERRY (GEORGIA) POLICE DEP'T, POLICE
SUPPLEMENTAL NARRATIVE (June 14, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter POLICE REPORT]).
6. See Johnson, supra note , at 985 n.98 (citing Memorandum from Ronald R. Brainard, to
Laraya M. Parnell (Oct. 14, 2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brainard Memo]).
7. See Johnson, supra note t, at 985 n.99.
702 [Vol. 92:4
2015] CRIMMIGRATION SYMPOSIUM: KEYNOTE ADDRESS 703
At about 11:15 p.m., Officer Brainard pulled over a black Chevrolet
Tahoe heading south on 1-75. The police report does not suggest that the
driver, Adrian Moncrieffe, was traveling in excess of the speed limit or
otherwise violating the traffic laws. When Officer Brainard's vehicle
passed Moncrieffe's sport utility vehicle (SUV), the officer claimed to
make an observation that is somewhat hard to believe. He said that in the
dark of night, he could see that the tinting on the windows of
Moncrieffe's vehicle appeared to be darker than permitted by Georgia
law. Officer Brainard later explained that he looks for "any driving be-
haviors that people use to avoid law enforcement contact" and "any vio-
lation of the law that establishes probable cause to make a traffic stop."9
Officer Brainard further explained why window tint violations are his
preferred justification for a stop:
[T]he vehicle that passed me had an obvious tint violation.. . . I par-
ticularly like the tint violation as a reason for stopping folks because
it negates the argument that I stopped a particular sex or race. If you
can't see what is in the vehicle, they certainly can't say you stopped
them because they were a particular sex or race. In today's world, it
seems to be the number one argument presented as a defense.'
0
After the stop, Officer Brainard approached the vehicle. The police
report states that he "saw the window roll down and made contact with
two B/Ms inside the vehicle. The driver was later identified as Adrian
Moncrieffe . . . and the passenger as Keyoanta Robinson."" Officer
Brainard later confirmed that "B/Ms" was shorthand for "Black males."l2
He asked Moncrieffe to exit the vehicle and interviewed him. Officer
Brainard said that he interviewed the two men separately so he could
compare their stories to try to determine whether they were telling the
truth. "
B. The Officer's Suspicions
In the police report, Officer Brainard identifies a number of factors
that he suggests made him suspicious that criminal activity was afoot.14
The report notes that he smelled a strong odor of air freshener in the
Chevrolet Tahoe, and he saw air fresheners on the rearview mirror and in
the backseat.
Officer Brainard stated in the police report that he thought that
Moncrieffe had more luggage than was necessary for a long weekend in
Atlanta. I do not know about any of you, but some people I know - in-
8. See id. at 985.
9. Id at 985 (footnote omitted).
10. Id. at 985-86 (quoting POLICE REPORT, supra note 5).
11. Id. at 986 (quoting POLICE REPORT, supra note 5) (emphasis added)).
12. Id. at 986 n.102 (quoting Brainard Memo, supra note 6)).
13. See id. at 989 (citing POLICE REPORT, supra note 5).
14. See id. at 986-88.
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cluding members of my family - travel with what I think is excessive
luggage.
Officer Brainard also wrote in the report that he thought that it was
odd that Moncrieffe was "taking a friend to hang with him while alleged-
ly visiting his daughter in Atlanta." 5 Moncrieffe, however, understanda-
bly might have wanted company on the drive from Florida to Georgia.
To this point, the concerns that Officer Brainard listed in the police
report probably did not amount to the probable cause necessary to justify
a search of the vehicle. One is left with the impression that the officer
seemed to be trying to conjure something up to justify a search.
Officer Brainard next talked to the passenger of the vehicle, Keyo-
anta Robinson. Officer Brainard stated that, at the time, he first smelled
marijuana in the SUV. He later explained that "the air freshener had
worn off, and he could smell the marijuana."
Robinson told Officer Brainard the same story that Moncrieffe told
him about the trip from Miami to Atlanta. The officer found that suspi-
cious, suggesting that they both relayed the same story because they had
practiced in advance what to say. The consistency of the two statements
might just as well have resulted from the fact that both men were telling
the truth.
Officer Brainard next asked Robinson if he had been smoking mari-
juana. The police report states that he then observed signs of an "adrena-
line dump in that [Robinson's] breathing became quick and shallow,"
and he could see Robinson "visibly shaking." 7 Now, if a police officer
were to ask me if I had been smoking marijuana, my response probably
would be just as Officer Brainard described.
Another officer, Kessler (whose first name is not provided in the
police report), arrived on the scene. Kessler was Officer Brainard's part-
ner. When one of the officers pulled somebody over, the other officer
would come to assist.1 Brainard decided that he would search the vehi-
cle. He asked Moncrieffe if he had been smoking marijuana. Moncrieffe
admitted to smoking a "blunt" - a marijuana cigarette - earlier in the
day. Officer Brainard then handcuffed Moncrieffe and Robinson, telling
them that they were being taken into custody. Immediately before the
search of the vehicle, Moncrieffe told the officer that there was some
marijuana in the vehicle.
15. Id. at 988.
16. See id at 989.
17. Id. at 989 (quoting POLICE REPORT supra note 5).
18. See id at 989-90.
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C. The Search
There are indications that the traffic stop was for the purpose of
drug interdiction. Officer Brainard regularly patrolled the interstate with
a drug-sniffing dog, K9 Rex. The officer had the dog sniff the exterior of
the Chevrolet Tahoe. According to the police report, K9 Rex smelled
something in the vehicle.'9
Officer Brainard found two baggies containing a small amount of
marijuana. He also located a wallet that included "bundles of cash," to-
taling to a little over a thousand dollars. He explained that, in his experi-
ence, the separation of cash into bundles was a practice followed by drug
dealers to keep track of where they had collected the money. I am not
sure whether the fact that someone had a thousand dollars on a trip is a
reasonable hint of criminal wrongdoing. Moncrieffe, while traveling out
of state, understandably might have carried some extra cash in the event
that he had car trouble or had other unplanned expenses.
Officer Brainard decided that there was not enough evidence to
charge Robinson with a crime. He, however, charged Moncrieffe with
possession of marijuana under a Georgia statute that penalized the pos-
session of a small amount of marijuana for personal use as well as pos-
session of large amounts of marijuana for sale.20
D. A Justifiable Stop, Search, and Arrest?
If one looks at the entire police interaction, there are numerous sug-
gestions that race played a role in the stop, search, and arrest of Adrian
Moncrieffe. One is left with the impression that Officer Brainard and his
partner Kessler were monitoring traffic on Interstate 75 as part of a drug
interdiction effort. It was not a coincidence that hey had a drug-sniffing
canine in the patrol car. Officer Brainard's conduct in the stop and sub-
sequent events certainly appears to have been influenced by the fact that
both Moncrieffe and Robinson were "B/Ms."
The window tint violation might have served as a pretext for race
for the traffic stop. The stop, even if based on pretext, still might not
violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
21
and seizures under Whren v. United States, which held that an officer's
subjective intent in conducting a traffic stop does not matter so long as
there is probable cause to believe that there was a violation of the traffic
laws has occurred. The smell of marijuana in the vehicle, if the officer's
statement is accepted as true, probably would justify a search. A small
amount of marijuana, if found through a valid search, could serve as the
basis for a criminal prosecution.
19. See id. at 990.
20. See id. at 992-93.
21. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
It does not appear from the opinion that the Supreme Court in
Moncrieffe considered race at all in analyzing the question of immigra-
tion law before it. Moncrieffe's race is not even mentioned in the Court's
opinion. For all intents and purposes, the Court treated the case as a run-
of-the-mill immigration case.
Moncrieffe was the second time in the last five Terms that the Court
rejected the U.S. government's argument that a relatively minor drug
crime constituted an "aggravated felony" under the U.S. immigration
laws. In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,22 the Court in 2010 held that a
conviction of a lawful permanent resident from Mexico for the posses-
sion of one tablet of Xanax alone was not an aggravated felony under the
immigration laws. That case, as well as Moncrieffe, demonstrates that
long-term lawful permanent residents are subject to the threat of manda-
tory removal from the United States. The Obama administration aggres-
sively defended both cases all the way to the Supreme Court.
Currently, the administration is pressing a case in the Court involv-
ing a lawful permanent resident who was convicted for possession of
23
drug paraphernalia. What was the paraphernalia? A sock. Mellouli had
placed four tablets of Adderall in his sock and pled guilty to the posses-
sion of drug paraphernalia.
The Obama administration, through a variety of programs, has
greatly increased the number of immigrants removed from the United
States. And, as in Moncrieffe, it has aggressively defended removal cases
based on relatively minor criminal convictions. One of most significant
things about the President's various immigration announcements in No-
vember 2014 is the dismantling of Secure Communities, a program that
focused removal efforts on immigrants arrested for virtually all crimes
that allowed the administration to ramp up removals to approximately
400,000 a year, an increase from about 20,000 to 30,000 in the early
1990s. Ninety-six percent of those removed are Latina/os, while a much
smaller percentage of the undocumented and legal immigrant population
is Latina/o.
CONCLUSION
Racial profiling in traffic stops has been at the heart of the "war on
drugs" and unquestionably has disparate impacts on people of color.
When triggered into action by a racially suspect criminal justice system,
the federal immigration removal system can logically be expected to
exacerbate those racially disparate impacts. To make matters worse, the
22. 560 U.S. 563 (2010).
23. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983-84 (2015). After I delivered this keynote
address, the Court rejected the removal order. See id at 1980.
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relationship and the magnitude of these racially disparate impacts are
obscured by the fact that the two systems appear to operate in a color-
blind, race-neutral, fair, and nonarbitrary way.
Moncrieffe is the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Focusing removal ef-
forts on noncitizens with criminal convictions, as the Executive Branch
currently does, compounds the racial impacts of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Given the reliance of the immigration removal system on the crimi-
nal justice system, one can expect removals to fall overwhelmingly on
Latina/os, as is precisely the case.
Over the last ten years, there has been considerable discussion of
immigration reform. In my estimation, one of the matters that deserves
attention in reform efforts is the racially disparate impacts of the modem
immigration removal process. Unfortunately, I do not think that the role
of race in the contemporary removal process is on the radar screen of
Congress or the President.

